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What makes an action intentional and when does someone do something intentionally? This is 
one of the main and most important questions within the branch of philosophy called “action 
theory”. According to Alfred Mele, “central to the philosophy of action is a concern to 
understand intentional action” (1992, p.199). However, the notion of intentional action does 
not find its origins in the philosophy of action: rather, it predates philosophy of action, as part 
of our everyday understanding of human behavior. Thus, an adequate account of intentional 
action cannot stray too far from our common understanding of which actions count as 
intentional, and should not lose sight of our “folk” concept of intentional action, or else run 
the risk of missing its target. For this reason, empirical investigations of the folk concept of 
intentional action can be expected to be highly relevant for philosophy of action, and it is no 
wonder that numerous experimental philosophers have tried to dissect the common sense 
category of “intentional action”.  
 Philosophical accounts have traditionally emphasized three factors: foreknowledge, 
choice and control. Malle and Knobe (1997) have empirically investigated which factors 
laypeople deem relevant for intentional action and their results closely matched these models, 
as people insisted on the five following components: awareness and belief, desire and 
intention
i
, and skill. 
 However, if these first studies gave results that were mostly in agreement with what 
should be expected from philosophical accounts of intentional action, later researches 
revealed puzzling phenomena that suggested that one important feature of our folk concept of 
intentional action had been overlooked: far from being a purely descriptive component of folk 
psychology, our concept of intentional action would have a normative (or evaluative) 
component as well. If this turned out to be true, this would dramatically change our 
understanding of the folk concept of intentional action. 
 In this chapter, I provide a critical though comprehensive review of the empirical 
literature on the folk concept of intentional action. After defending what I think to be the best 
explanation for the results of these studies, I go back to the implications for action theory. 
 
1. Two puzzles for intentional action: the Knobe Effect and the Skill Effect 
 
Recently, experimental evidence suggested that our judgments about whether an action counts 
as intentional are sensitive to normative (or evaluative) factors. Evidence for the putative 
influence of such considerations on ascriptions of intentionality arises from the study of two 
phenomena, both discovered by Joshua Knobe: the “Knobe Effect” and the “Skill Effect”. 
 
1.1. The Knobe Effect 
The Knobe Effect (also known in the literature as the “Side-effect Effect”) can be described 
as the observation that whether a side effect is considered intentional highly depends on its 
valence. Consider the following scenario (Knobe 2003a): 
 
Harm Case: The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board 
and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase 
profits, but it will also harm the environment.” The chairman of the board 
answered, “I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just want to make 
as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.” They started the new 
program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed. 
 
In his original study, Knobe found that 82% of the people surveyed answered ‘yes’ to the 
question, “did the chairman of the board intentionally harm the environment?” When given 
the same vignette, but this time with the word ‘harm’ changed into ‘help’ (the Help Case), 
only 23% responded positively when asked if the chairman of the board intentionally helped 
the environment. This striking asymmetry has since been replicated in other languages and 
cultures (Knobe & Burra, 2006; Cova & Naar, 2012a; Dalbauer & Hergovich, 2013), in 
young children (Leslie, Knobe & Cohen, 2006; Pellizzoni, Siegal & Surian, 2009), in people 
suffering from Asperger Syndrome (Zalla & Leboyer, 2011) and in patients with cerebral 
lesions to the prefrontal cortex (Young et al. 2006). More recently, it has been shown that the 
means whereby an agent achieves her goal exhibit asymmetries similar to the Knobe Effect 
(Cova and Naar, 2012a). 
 
1.2. The Skill Effect 
The Skill Effect can be described as the fact that normative (or evaluative) considerations 
modulate the impact of the control factor on ascriptions of intentionality. Consider the 
following scenario: 
 
Bull’s-eye (Skill): Jake desperately wants to win the rifle contest. He knows that 
he will only win the contest if he hits the bull’s-eye. He raises the rifle, gets the 
bull’s-eye in the sights, and presses the trigger. 
Jake is an expert marksman. His hands are steady. The gun is aimed perfectly… 
The bullet lands directly on the bull’s-eye. Jake wins the contest. 
 
In this case, 79% of participants answered that Jake intentionally hit the bull’s-eye. Now, 
consider the Bull’s-eye (No-Skill) case in which the second paragraph is modified: 
 
But Jake isn’t very good at using his rifle. His hand slips on the barrel of the gun, 
and the shot goes wild… Nonetheless, the bullet lands directly on the bull’s-eye. 
Jake wins the contest. 
 
In this case, only 28% of participants answered that Jake intentionally hit the bull’s-eye. 
These results show that ascriptions of intentionality also depend on the degree of control the 
agent exerts on his action. Nothing surprising, one would say. But now consider the following 
pair of scenarios: 
 
Aunt (Skill): Jake desperately wants to have more money. He knows that he will 
inherit a lot of money when his aunt dies. One day, he sees his aunt walking by 
the window. He raises his rifle, gets her in the sights, and presses the trigger. 
Jake is an expert marksman. His hands are steady. The gun is aimed perfectly… 
The bullet hits her directly in the heart. She dies instantly. 
Aunt (No-Skill): […] But Jake isn’t very good at using his rifle. His hand slips on 
the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes wild… Nonetheless, the bullet hits her 
directly in the heart. She dies instantly. 
 
In the Skill condition, 95% of participants answered that Jake intentionally killed his aunt. 
76% did so in the No-Skill condition. Once again, the outcome is perceived as less intentional 
when the agent exerts less control. But this difference is much smaller in this case (19%) than 
in the Bull’s-eye pair (51%). These results suggest that the contribution of control to 
ascriptions of intentionality is greatly diminished when the outcome is bad (or good, see 
Knobe 2003b).
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1.3. Two questions for accounts of our concept of intentional action 
These two sets of experiments suggest that normative or evaluative considerations can (i) play 
a role in our ascriptions of intentionality and (ii) modulate the extent to which the control 
factor has an impact on these ascriptions. Thus, two questions can be asked: 
 
1) Are these effects really due to normative (or evaluative) considerations impacting 
ascriptions of intentionality? 
2) If they are, should we consider the impact of these considerations as part of our normal 
application of the concept of intentional action, or as a bias leading us to improperly 
apply this concept? 
 
In the rest of this chapter, I address both questions by surveying the different accounts of the 
Knobe Effect that have been proposed.
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 Throughout this survey, I also list the conditions an 
account of the concept of intentional account must fulfill if it is to count as a proper and 
satisfying account. Indeed, most accounts available in the literature fail because they do not 
engage with the whole empirical literature, but only focus on a subset of data. By listing these 
conditions, I hope to help future accounts not to fall into these shortcomings. 
The reason why I chose to focus on the Knobe Effect is that it has attracted much more 
attention than the Skill Effect. Admittedly, this is a problem: an adequate understanding of 
our concept of intentional action should account for both phenomena. We thus have our first 
condition for a proper account of the folk concept of intentional action: 
 
(Comprehensiveness) A proper account should explain both the Knobe Effect and the 
Skill Effect. 
 
2. Normative and evaluative considerations: a constitutive component of intentional 
action, or just a bias? 
 
Let’s admit for the moment that the Knobe Effect is due to normative or evaluative 
considerations shaping our ascriptions of intentionality, and let’s ask whether we should 
consider this influence as a mere bias, or as revealing something about the deep structure of 
our concept of intentional action. 
 
2.1. The Knobe Effect as a bias 
One possible way of reacting at the Knobe Effect is to accept the existence of the effect but to 
claim it teaches us nothing about the folk concept of intentional action because it is just an 
instance of people misapplying this concept or speaking against their mind: normative and 
evaluative considerations ‘bias’ participants’ answer and distort their judgments about 
intentional action. This hypothesis comes in two flavors: psychological and linguistic. 
The ‘psychological’ version of this approach argues that people are mistaken, and do 
not properly apply their concept of intentional action in the Harm case (Malle & Nelson, 
2003; Pinillos et al., 2011; Sauer & Bates, 2013). A popular version of this account is the 
‘Blame Bias’ account. This account rests on previous psychological evidence that people are 
ready to distort their attributions of key conditions for blame (such as judgments about 
causation or attributions of mental states) in order to motivate and justify their negative 
assessment of a given character (see Alicke, 2008; Alicke & Rose, 2010). According to this 
account, (Nadelhoffer, 2004a, 2004b, 2006c; Alicke, 2008), when we are not driven by our 
willingness to praise or blame, we usually do not consider side effects or action performed 
with lack of control to be intentional, but the perceived blameworthiness or praiseworthiness 
of the agent can lead us to attribute intentionality to the agent’s action to motivate and justify 
our attributions of blame and praise. Thus, the asymmetry in the Help and Harm cases is 
explained by another asymmetry: that we are prone to blame the chairman in the Harm Case 
but not to praise him in the Help Case. 
Nevertheless, the scope of this account is limited. First, one version of this account, 
according to which it is participants’ negative affective reactions at the chairman’s personality 
that distorts our attributions of intentionality (Nadelhoffer, 2006), fails to explain why the 
Knobe Effect can be found in populations that have impoverished affective reactions due to 
brain damage (Young et al. 2006). Second, no available version of this account can explain 
the existence of asymmetries similar to the Knobe Effect in non-moral, non-emotionally 
biased cases, such as the following (drawn from Wright & Bengson, 2009 and inspired from 
Knobe & Mendlow, 2004): 
 
Sales (Decrease): The VP of a company went to the chairperson of the board and said, 
“We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will 
also decrease sales in New Jersey.” The chairperson of the board answered, “I don’t 
care at all about decreasing sales in New Jersey. I just want to make as much profit as 
I can. Let’s start the new program.” They started the new program. Sure enough, 
profits increased and sales in New Jersey decreased. 
 
In this case, most participants answered that the chairperson intentionally decreased the sales 
in New Jersey. Now, in the Sales (Increase) case, the word “decrease” was replaced by 
“increase”, and most participants answered that the chairperson did not intentionally increase 
the sales in New Jersey. However, this asymmetry was not correlated with an asymmetry in 
judgments of praise and blame: participants did not tend to attribute more blame to the VP in 
the Decrease case than praise in the Increase case. 
In response to these challenges, Wright and Bengson (2009) have developed an affect-
free version of this account, according to which people use the following heuristic: an agent 
must have done something intentionally if he is responsible for it. Switching from ‘blame’ 
and ‘praise’ to the more neutral concept of ‘responsibility’ allows them to accommodate non-
moral cases such as the Sales cases. However, two criticisms can be raised. First, in 
participants with Asperger Syndrome, the Knobe Effect is present even though these patients 
attribute a lot of praise (and thus responsibility) to the chairman in the Help case (Zalla & 
Leboyer, 2011). Second, even in normal participants, responsibility judgments do not 
accurately track ascriptions of intentionality in all cases (Cova & Naar, 2012b). 
 The ‘linguistic’ version of the hypothesis is the one that grants the less depth to the 
Knobe Effect: according to it, participants do not even really believe that the chairman 
intentionally harmed the environment in the Harm case. A first version, developed by Adams 
and Steadman (2004a, 2004b, 2007), consider the Knobe Effect as the product of 
conversational implicatures: people use the word “intentionally” in morally bad cases to 
conversationally imply that the agent deserves blame. However, we already saw that blame 
judgments were not the best predictor of intentionality judgments. 
 Another version, put forward by Guglielmo and Malle (2010a), argues that the Knobe 
Effect is only due to the forced-choice setting of the original experiment. Indeed, people 
might choose to answer that the chairman intentionally harmed the environment to convey 
something else: that he did it ‘willingly’ or ‘recklessly’. To test for this hypothesis, Guglielmo 
and Malle had participants in the Harm choose between several descriptions of the chairman’s 
action which ones were correct and most accurate. The four descriptions were that the 
chairman ‘willingly, ‘knowingly’, ‘intentionally’ and ‘purposefully’ harmed the environment. 
Guglielmo and Malle observed that most participants (86%) chose the description involving 
‘knowingly’ and that very few (1%) chose the description containing intentionally. 
 Such results might suggest that the original Knobe Effect was just an artifact 
imputable to the constraints of the original task and that people only speak truly when they are 
given the choice between several options (Woolfolk, 2013). However, this presupposes that 
Guglielmo and Malle’s multiple choice is a better measure than forced-choice settings. To 
determine whether a new method of measurement is reliable, one has to calibrate it on 
uncontroversial cases. To this purpose, I created a modified version of the Harm case in 
which harming the environment is a means rather than a side-effect (Cova, 2014b). Most 
philosophical accounts of intentional action would predict that, in this case, harming the 
environment is intentional, since means are intentional (but see: Cova & Naar, 2012a). 
However, when I used Guglielmo and Malle’s method, it turned out that the claim according 
to which the chairman intentionally harmed the environment was rarely chosen. So, we face a 
choice: conclude that their measure is unreliable, or get ready for a very revisionary account 
of intentional action. 
 To summarize, most ‘biasing’ accounts fail because the asymmetry observed by 
Knobe can be reproduced in cases involving neither upsetting events, nor blame attributions, 
such as the Sales case. This leads us to formulate our second condition: 
 
(Morally neutral cases) A proper account should explain why asymmetries similar to 
the original Knobe Effect can be observed in cases involving no moral violation. 
 
2.2. Evaluative considerations as part of our concept of intentional action 
Thus, it seems that the Knobe Effect cannot be simply explained away as the product of bias. 
But if we accept that the effect is driven by normative or evaluative considerations, what 
conclusions should we draw from its existence? According to Knobe himself (2006), his 
results show that folk psychology is not purely descriptive, as is often assumed, but also 
designed to fulfill evaluative functions. Starting from the rather mundane observation that 
ascriptions of intentionality are important inputs for our judgments of praise and blame, 
Knobe advances the hypothesis that our concept of intentional action has in fact specifically 
‘evolved’ to play this role: that ascriptions of intentionality play a fundamental role in 
attributions of praise or blame is not an accident, but reveals their true function. 
 Knobe distinguishes between two kinds of evaluations: the judgment that an action has 
led to a bad (or good) outcome
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, and the judgment that one deserves blame (or praise) for a 
given action. With this distinction in mind, the question is: how do we go from the first kind 
of judgment (that someone did something bad) to the second kind (that this person is 
blameworthy)? Knobe’s answer is that we use certain tools, among which the concept of 
intentional action: the function of our concept of intentional action is “to track the 
psychological features that are most relevant to praise and blame judgments.” (p.225) 
 However, it is not clear that the way we go from evaluation of the outcome (good/bad) 
to evaluation of the agent (praiseworthy/blameworthy) is the same for both bad and good 
actions. As Knobe points out, “different psychological features will be relevant depending on 
whether the behavior itself is good or bad” (p.225). Indeed, as I already pointed out, there is 
an asymmetry in the way we attribute blame for bad actions and praise for good actions: 
knowing that one’s action will have bad consequences seems to be enough to deserve blame 
for them, while only knowing that one’s action will have good consequences is not enough to 
deserve praise – one also had to intend to bring about these specific consequences. Thus, if 
ascriptions of blame or praise are asymmetric, and if our concept of intentional action is 
designed to drive our ascriptions of blame and praise, then it is only natural that it is sensitive 
to different features according to whether we apply it to good or bad actions.
 
 In Knobe’s first account of the Knobe Effect, if an outcome counts as bad, then it 
should be considered intentional if the agent either tried to bring it about or foresaw that 
acting in the way he did would bring it about. Thus, a bad behavior can be intentional even if 
it is only foreseen (as harming the environment in the Harm Case). On the contrary, when the 
outcome is good, it should be considered intentional only if the agent was specifically trying 
to bring it about (which is not the case for helping the environment in the Help Case) (see 
Figure 1). 
However, although this account can explain the asymmetry between the Harm and the 
Help cases, it fails to explain other cases such as Mele and Cushman (2007)’s Pond case in 
which the protagonist must fill the empty pond next to her lot to prevent an infestation of 
mosquitoes, thereby making the children who used to play next to the pond sad. The key idea 
is that, in this case, the protagonist expresses deep regrets at bringing about the bad outcome 
of making the children sad. Most of the participants judged that the protagonist did not 
intentionally made them sad, though she clearly foresaw this bad outcome, which speaks 
directly against the account I presented in this section.
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Thus, Knobe’s first account fails because it does not accommodate the fact that the 
attitude an agent takes towards a given side-effect also impacts our ascriptions of 
intentionality, independently of what he intends or believes. Therefore, an adequate theory 
must also satisfy the following condition: 
 
(Attitudes) A proper account should accommodate the fact that the agent’s attitude 
towards a side-effect (whether he brings it about reluctantly, indifferently, or joyfully) 
has an impact on our ascriptions of intentionality. 
 
2.3. The pervasive impact of moral judgment 
However, Knobe has substantially modified his account since 2006, and the current version 
actually satisfies (Attitudes). In a series of papers (Pettit & Knobe, 2009; Knobe, 2010a), 
Knobe has extended his thesis about the concept of intentional action (i.e. that the concept is 
not only descriptive but partly evaluative) to a wide array of psychological concepts: 
“desiring”, “deciding”, “advocating”, “being in favor of”, “believing” or “knowing”. Indeed, 
asymmetries similar to the Knobe Effect for intentional action have been observed for these 
concepts: for example, people are more likely to answer that the chairman desired to harm the 
environment (in the Harm case) than to say that the chairman desired to help the environment 
(in the Help case) (Pettit & Knobe, 2009). Similar patterns have also been found to affect the 
way people understand causation (Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009) and the way they build action 
trees and see one action as counting as a means or a side-effect (Knobe, 2010b). This led 
Knobe to conclude that the impact of evaluative considerations on our application of 
psychological concepts is not specific to our concept of intentional action, but is rather a deep 
and fundamental feature of folk psychology.  
According to Knobe (2010), the fact that asymmetries similar to the Knobe Effect can 
be found in many other cases put pressure on what counts as an adequate account of the 
Knobe effect: it is not enough to have an explanation that works for judgments about 
intentional action, if this account does not also apply to these other asymmetries. Surely, one 
cannot just postulate that all asymmetries have the same source and explanation. However, 
psychological concepts such as desire and choice seem tightly closed to our concept of 
intentional action, and it seems that a proper account of the Knobe Effect should also apply to 
these asymmetries. This argument has since been dubbed the ‘argument from unification’ 
(Hindriks, 2014) and has become a topic of debate (Sauer, 2014). It also suggests that if, as I 
proposed, a proper account of the folk concept of intentional action should account for the 
Knobe Effect, then a proper account should also account for asymmetries in related concepts. 
This condition might seem too demanding for an account of our folk concept of intentional 
action, and I will get back to this question in section 4, but it seems likely that an account of 
our folk concept of intentional action will be ceteris paribus better if it explains the 
relationship between the Knobe Effect and these other asymmetries. 
Pettit and Knobe (2009) propose an account that satisfies this demand by explaining all 
asymmetries in our application of motivational psychological concepts. Let’s start with the 
following example: suppose a beer and a cup of coffee are both at the temperature of 20°C. 
Application of ‘cold’ to these beverages might plausibly yield a true statement in the coffee 
case and a false statement in the beer case because people rate each liquid relative to a default 
value that specifies what it is supposed to be like for it to be cold (Figure 2). Similarly, in the 
Harm and Help cases, judgments about intentional action are evaluated by comparing the 
chairman’s actual attitudes towards the outcome to a default value, and this default value 
differ depending on the outcome. More precisely, Pettit and Knobe argue that the default 
value is partly determined by what we normatively expect the agent to desire: we think people 
should desire to help the environment, so the default point in the Help case is an attitude 
above indifference. But we think people should be reluctant to harm the environment, so the 
default point is set below indifference in the Harm case (Figure 3). This is why the same 
attitude on the chairman’s behalf (his indifference) leads people to judge his action intentional 
in the Harm case (in which indifference is above the default point) but not in the Help case (in 
which indifference is below the default point). 
 
 This account has two main advantages. First, it can be extended to a great number 
psychological attitudes, and thus not only explain the Knobe Effect, but also a lot of similar 
asymmetries, thus fulfilling the demand of unity. Second, because it relies on the comparison 
of the agents’ attitudes to a standard, it takes into account both the effect of normative 
considerations and the fluctuation of the agent’s attitudes, thus fulfilling (Attitudes). For 
example, it is true that, in the Pond case, the side-effect is bad, and that the default point for 
intentionality is set below indifference (the agent should be reluctant to cause the relevant 
side-effect). However, in this case, the agent is not indifferent: she is in fact very reluctant to 
make the children sad. Thus, her attitudes towards the outcome are still below the default 
point, and this is why she is judged not to have brought about a bad side-effect intentionally. 
 
2.4. Norms and the Knobe Effect 
Thus, Knobe’s current account is an improvement on his earlier account, since it fulfills both 
(Attitudes) and (Morally neutral cases). However, one should note that it does not fulfill 
(Comprehensiveness), since he does not account for the Skill Effect. Moreover, Knobe 
himself found a case that poses a threat to his later account. Consider the following case 
(drawn from Knobe, 2007): 
 
Nazi Law (Violation): In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the ‘racial 
identification law.’ The purpose of the law was to help identify people of certain races 
so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps. Shortly after this 
law was passed, the CEO of a small corporation decided to make certain 
organizational changes. The Vice-President of the corporation said: ‘By making those 
changes, you’ll definitely be increasing our profits. But you’ll also be violating the 
requirements of the racial identification law.’ The CEO said: ‘Look, I know that I’ll be 
violating the requirements of the law, but I don’t care one bit about that. All I care 
about is making as much profit as I can. Let’s make those organizational changes!’ As 
soon as the CEO gave this order, the corporation began making the organizational 
changes. 
 
In the Fulfillment case, all occurrences of ‘violating’ were replaced by ‘fulfilling.’ In the 
Violation case, 81% of participants said the CEO intentionally violated the requirements of 
the law, while only 30% of participants said he intentionally fulfilled the requirements of the 
law in the Fulfillment case. This asymmetry cannot be explained by Knobe’s account: surely, 
it is better if a Nazi law is violated than fulfilled, and we consider that the CEO should desire 
to violate it. 
 To account for such cases, Holton (2010) has proposed a competing account according 
to which the asymmetry in ascriptions of intentionality is directly caused by another 
asymmetry in norms. Thus, Holton claims that there is a fundamental asymmetry concerning 
norms: to intentionally violate a norm, all one needs to do is to knowingly violate it, whereas 
to intentionally conform to a norm one needs to be counterfactually guided by it. And since 
whether a norm was intentionally violated or conformed are supposed to influence our 
ascriptions of intentionality, we have an explanation for the Knobe Effect. 
 One advantage of Holton’s account is that it allows the asymmetry in ascriptions of 
intentionality to be driven by whatever norm is salient to participants, and not only by the 
norms participants actually endorse. Thus, participants’ answers to the Nazi Law cases nicely 
fits Holton’s account, provided that we suppose that the Nazi law is a more salient norm in 
this context that moral norms. And indeed, recent evidence suggest that judgments about 
intentional action can be manipulated by making certain norms more or less salient 
(Robinson, Stey & Alfano, in press). Thus, we can add a new condition to our collection: 
 
(Norms) A proper account should account for the fact that norms seem able to drive 
asymmetries similar to the Knobe Effect independently of side-effects’ valence. 
 
However, accounts in terms of norms also fail on neutral cases, in which it seems possible to 
have asymmetries without norms, such as the Sales case: surely, there is no norm against the 
VP decreasing sales. Moreover, in its current form, Holton’s account does not fit the 
(Attitudes) condition either. However, it is an intriguing alternative to Knobe’s account, which 
allows for a wider impact of normative considerations – for it allows participants’ ascriptions 
of intentionality to be impacted by norms these participants do not share.
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3. A Knobe Effect without evaluative considerations? 
 
So far, I have only surveyed accounts that acknowledged some influence of normative and 
evaluative considerations upon ascriptions of intentionality. However, a substantial number of 
accounts do not, and aim at giving an account of the Knobe Effect that does not appeal to 
such considerations. Some of them even claim that there is no effect to begin with. 
 
3.1. Can the Knobe Effect be explained away? 
Indeed, it has been suggested by some that the Knobe Effect can be reduced to a more 
fundamental, and hopefully less puzzling phenomenon. The more popular version of this 
strategy appeals to an asymmetry in the agent’s desires and claims that the Knobe Effect is 
just an artifact that can be easily explained by the fact (i) that we consider an outcome more 
intentional when the agent actually intended or desired this outcome and (ii) that participants 
tend to consider that the chairman in the Harm case desires to harm the environment while the 
chairman in the Help case does not desire to help the environment (Guglielmo & Malle, 
2010a).
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 Of course, in Knobe’s original vignettes, both chairmen explicitly state that they 
just do not care, but participants need not take these statements at face value. Some have 
argued that participants in fact tend to attribute more desire towards the outcome in the Harm 
case, because behaviors that are contrary to norms are more informative than behaviors that 
conform to norms: it takes nothing to conform a norm, but since transgressing a norm is a 
deviation from ‘normality’, it seems to tell us something about the agent’s motivations (Uttich 
& Lombrozo, 2010). 
 From this point of view, the Knobe Effect seems to tell us nothing new or surprising 
about our concept of intentional action: people just attribute more intentional action in the 
Harm case because they are more likely to see the agent in this case as desiring harming the 
environment (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010a). As evidence in favor of this account of the Knobe 
Effect, it is often pointed at the fact that intentionality ratings tend to be lower in the Harm 
case when the agent is regretful and tend to be higher in the Help case when the agent 
expresses his joy at helping the environment. However, as we have seen, this is not 
incompatible with Knobe’s latest account of the asymmetry: rather, Knobe explicitly 
acknowledges that variations in agents’ attitudes will be reflected in ascriptions of 
intentionality. What then is the difference between Knobe’s latest account and the kind of 
account we just described? Simply that Knobe would claim that the level of attitude required 
for the action to be judged intentional will be lower than in the Harm than in the Help case, 
because the default point is set lower in the Harm case. On the contrary, those who wish to 
‘explain away’ the Knobe Effect by making attitudes the only relevant factor should predict 
that, attitudes towards the side-effect being equal, ascriptions of intentionality should be 
identical in the Harm and Help cases. However, this is not what is happening when one takes 
a careful look at Guglielmo and Malle (2010)’s results: rather, their results seem to vindicate 
Knobe’s predictions (see Figure 4). Thus, it is far from clear that the influence of moral 
considerations on judgments of intentionality can be dismissed by the mere observation that 
intentionality ratings vary along the agent’s attitudes towards the outcome.  
 Other accounts have followed Guglielmo and Malle in trying to reduce the Knobe 
Effect to a more basic and less puzzling asymmetry. For example, Sripada (2010, 2012) 
proposed that the asymmetry could be explained by the concordance between the outcome 
and the agents’ ‘Deep Self’ (i.e. his deeply held values) and argued that the influence of 
normative considerations on judgments of intentionality disappeared once controlled for these 
attitudes (Sripada & Konrath, 2011).
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 Similarly, Shepard and Wolff (2013) have proposed to 
reduce the asymmetry to another asymmetry in causal judgments: indeed, participants are 
more willing to say that the chairman caused the side-effect in the Harm case than in the Help 
case. However, it seems that, even once controlled for all these factors, normative and 
evaluative considerations still play a role in shaping our judgments about intentional action 
(Cova, 2014b). 
 
2.2. A normativity-free Knobe Effect 
Another class of account acknowledges the existence of a genuine and irreducible asymmetry 
in ascriptions of intentionality, but claims that normative and evaluative considerations have 
nothing to do with it: to explain the Knobe Effect, one only needs to broaden the range of 
agent’s attitudes one deems relevant to judgments about intentional action. Two families of 
such accounts can be distinguished: 
 (i) According to the first kind of accounts, a side-effect counts as intentional when the 
agent has a reason not to bring it about. A famous example is Machery’s ‘Trade-Off 
Hypothesis’ (Machery, 2008) according to which the difference between intentional side 
effects and non-intentional side effects amounts to a difference in the level of cost that is 
foreseen by the agent in order to achieve his goal. When we conceptualize something as a cost 
incurred by an agent, we come to think that the cost has been incurred intentionally. For 
example, in the Harm Case, harming the environment is a cost. Thus, it is intentional. But, in 
the Help Case, helping the environment is not a cost.
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 As has been pointed out (e.g. Mallon, 2008), Machery’s claim is ambiguous. Are 
intentional side-effects those conceptualized as a cost by the participant reading the vignette 
or by the agent described in the vignette? If one chooses the first reading, then the account can 
no longer explain the asymmetry in the Nazi Law case. Thus, the account can only escape the 
difficulty faced by other accounts by choosing either the second reading or a blend of both 
reading (according to which a side-effect becomes intentional if it is conceived as a cost by 
the participant or by the agent). 
 This is probably why most versions of such accounts have endorsed a version of the 
thesis according to which it is the agent’s attitude (and not the participant’s) that matters (e.g. 
Turner, 2004). For example, in his ‘Normative Reasons account of Intentional Action’ (in 
short: NoRIA), Hindriks (2008, 2010, 2011, 2014) claims that a side-effect can only be 
intentional if the agent acted (i) in spite of the fact that he did not want to bring this side-
effect about, or (ii) in spite of the fact that he believed that bringing this side-effect about 
constituted a normative reason against acting the way he did. 
 Accounts that adopt the agent’s perspective fail on two points. First, these accounts 
cannot fulfill (Attitude). According to this account, the more an agent sees the side-effect as a 
cost, an obstacle, or a reason not to act, the more their bringing about this side-effect should 
be considered as intentional. However, take again the Pond case: in this case, the agent (Ann) 
is very reluctant to bring about the side-effect (making the children sad). Thus, she certainly 
conceives of the side-effect as a cost, and as a reason not to act – but the side-effect is judged 
smostly unintentional. What happens now when we contrast this case to a similar case in 
which the agent makes the children sad, but does not worry about it, and is wholly 
indifferent? The account in terms of ‘reasons not to’ should predict that ascriptions of 
intentionality will be even lower. However, we get exactly the opposite: in such cases, the 
side-effect is judged much more intentional (Cova, 2014a). In summary, these accounts make 
predictions that run directly against (Attitudes). 
 Second, these accounts cannot explain cases such as the Terrorist case (Knobe, 2004b; 
Cova, 2014a), in which a terrorist has planted a bomb in a nightclub to kill Americans but 
reluctantly defuses the bomb when he discovers that his own son is in it. When asked whether 
the terrorist intentionally save the Americans, most people answer that the terrorist did not 
intentionally save the Americans. However, he clearly had a reason not to save them, and this 
clearly was a cost to him. Thus, the accounts we just surveyed fail to account for this case.
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 (ii) A second kind of accounts focuses on the agent’s deliberation and the extent to 
which he takes the potential side-effect of his future action in consideration. According to the 
‘Deliberation Model’ (Alfano, Beebe, & Robinson, 2012), the asymmetry in ascriptions of 
intentionality should be explained by earlier asymmetries in other kinds of mental states such 
as beliefs, desires, and intentions. An agent who learns that one course of action leads to 
violating a norm is perceived by participants as more likely to stop and deliberate carefully 
about whether he should violate this norm or not.  Since deliberation leads to the formation of 
other mental states – such as beliefs, desires, and intentions – this difference underlies all 
asymmetries we have mentioned so far. Similarly, Scaife and Webber (2013) advanced the 
‘Consideration Hypothesis’, according to which people ascribe intentionality only when they 
think that the agent took the side-effect into consideration before acting, that is only when the 
agent assigned that side-effect some level of importance relative to the importance they 
assigned their primary objective. However, these accounts fail on the same points as accounts 
in terms of reason not to: they should predict that regretful agents are seen as acting more 
intentionally than indifferent agents, and should predict that most people consider the side-
effect intentional in cases such as Terrorist. Moreover, recent data suggest that the 
consideration the agent gave to a side-effect is not positively but negatively correlated with 
intentionality ratings (Cova, 2014a) and that attributions of beliefs do not predict judgments 
about intentional action once controlled for other factors (Cova, 2014b). 
 
4. The multiple meanings of “intentionally” 
 
So far, we haven’t met an account of the folk concept of intentional action that satisfies all the 
condition I have listed, that is an account that 
 
(Comprehensiveness) explains both the Knobe Effect and the Skill Effect, 
(Norms) explains the apparent norm-sensitivity of intentionality ascriptions, 
(Morally neutral cases) explains why we have asymmetries in cases in which there 
seems to have no moral violations, 
(Attitudes) and explains why regretful agents are considered as acting less 
intentionally. 
 
In this last section, I will sketch what I believe constitutes such an account, and I will do so by 
starting from a hypothesis we haven’t considered yet: that there is not only one folk concept 
of intentional action, but several. 
 
4.1. The ‘Interpretive Diversity’ hypothesis 
The ‘Interpretive Diversity’ hypothesis has first been advanced by Nichols and Ulatowski 
(2007). According to them, people actually ascribe two different meanings to the noun phrase 
“intentional action”: (i) ‘having a motive’ and (ii) ‘foreknowing’. Furthermore, one and the 
same person can adopt one or the other according to the context. Thus, in the Harm Case, 
when they use “intentionally”, most people mean “done with foreknowledge” and they judge 
the chairman as having harmed the environment “intentionally” (because he knew his action 
would harm the environment). But, in the Help Case, when they use “intentionally”, most 
people mean “done with a motive” and they consider the chairman as not having helped the 
environment “intentionally” (because he lacked a motive for helping the environment). 
Following Nichols and Ulatowski, others have tried to distinguish the different 
meanings in which the world “intentionally” is used. For example, Cushman and Mele (2008) 
have defended that people have “two and half folk concepts” of intentional action, a proposal 
that has since been outbid by Lanteri (2013), who proposed to cut the folk concept of 
intentional action in “three and a half”. Meanwhile, Sousa and Holbrook (2010) have tried to 
explain the Skill Effect by distinguishing between two interpretations of “intentionally”. 
Though none of these accounts can explain all the asymmetries we have seen so far
xi
, I think 
they are on the right track: “intentionally” is polysemous and part of what is happening in the 
Knobe Effect is due to this polysemy. 
 
4.2. The Knobe Effect as a linguistic phenomenon 
But why think that the Knobe Effect is a linguistic phenomenon? Did we not rule out this 
possibility in section 2.1? Not really: we only ruled out the possibility that the Knobe Effect 
might be a purely pragmatic phenomenon, but not the possibility that it might be a semantic 
phenomenon. 
 There are several reasons to think that the Knobe Effect take place at the semantic 
level, rather than at a deeper level (the one of folk psychology, for example). Let’s go back to 
Pettit and Knobe’s analogy with the beer and coffee temperature: it is true that norms seem to 
impact our judgments about whether a beverage should count as hot, and that these norms 
vary along beverage. However, this clearly does not mean that such norms have an impact on 
our capacity to estimate temperatures: though we judge the coffee cold and the beer hot, we 
can simultaneously judge that they both are at the same temperature. Thus, the fact that the 
truth of linguistic judgments is impacted by norms and normative considerations does not 
show that the underlying psychological competencies are. Thus, it could be that the truth-
value of sentences containing “intentionally” is sensitive to norms and normative 
considerations without our folk psychology being suffused with such considerations. 
 One might argue that the case of normative considerations is different from the one of 
standards about a beverage’s temperature. But take the following case (Egré & Cova, in 
press): 
 
10 children were present in a school when a fire broke out. 5 children survived, the 
other 5 died. 
o Would you say that many children died? 
o Would you say that many children survived? 
 
In this case, most people answered ‘YES’ to the first question and ‘NO’ to the second. 
However, exactly the same number of children died and survived. This suggests that the truth-
value of sentences containing “many” is impacted by moral and evaluative considerations. 
Should we then conclude that our ability to count and estimate quantities is fundamentally 
moral and driven by moral considerations? This seems preposterous. 
 Another clue that asymmetries such as the Knobe Effect only are present at a linguistic 
level and not at the deeper level of folk psychology is that they do not influence the way 
participants predict agents’ behavior. Indeed, although people are more likely to say that the 
chairman desired to bring about the side-effect in the Harm case, they do not perceive him as 
more likely to deliberately harm the environment (for no other reason) than the chairman of 
the Help case (see Cova, Dupoux & Jacob, 2010 for details). 
 As I said, Knobe’s account, according to which attributions of intentionality depend 
on default points that are influenced by evaluative and normative considerations, is directly 
inspired from the semantics of gradable expressions. It is thus possible to keep this intuition 
while discarding Knobe’s claim about our folk psychology fulfilling irreducible normative 
and evaluative functions. We thus reach a purely linguistic account of the Knobe Effect in 
which we treat statements including the word “intentionally” as having truth-conditions 
similar to the ones of sentences including gradable terms, so that statements about 
“intentionally” are true only if the agent’s attitudes towards the side-effect go beyond a 
certain default point (Egré, 2010, 2013).
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 Of course, we have seen that Knobe’s original account could not explain all cases we 
surveyed. Thus, some extra adjustments are necessary. The main one is introducing the notion 
of ‘expectation’ (Mandelbaum & Ripley, 2010; Cova, Dupoux & Jacob, 2012). Expectations 
can be both descriptive (we expect someone to do something because it is something he often 
does) and normative (we expect someone to do something because he ought to). We can thus 
modify Knobe’s account by postulating that the default point is set by both kinds of 
expectations. When several expectations are in conflict, the most salient (most of the time, the 
moral ones) win and determine where the default point should be set. This explain why the 
asymmetry seems to be driven primarily by what we morally expect the agent to desire (in the 
Harm, Help and Terrorist cases) but why, in absence of salient moral expectations, the default 
point is set by conventional norms (the Nazi Law case) or by what, based on his situation, the 
agent seems more likely to desire (the Sales case). 
 
4.3. Three concepts of intentional action 
The account we just sketched works for most of the asymmetries, at least those about the 
agent’s attitudes: it works not only for “intentionally” but also for “desire”, “intent” or “being 
opposed to”. Thus, we have an account that does not apply only to “intentionally”. However, 
it should be noted that there seems to be something peculiar to “intentionally”. First, 
asymmetries tend to be more extreme in the case of intentionally than in the case of other 
psychological predicates (Pettit & Knobe, 2009). Second, it is the only psychological 
predicate for which the Skill Effect has been observed so far.
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 Therefore, the account based 
on analogy with the semantics of – which applies to different psychological predicates – is not 
the whole story: there must be something more, something specific to “intentionally”. 
 Based on informal observation – most of my participants, when tested in groups of 
friends, disagreed about what “intentionally” meant, I have argued that the word 
“intentionally” can have three different meanings (Cova, Dupoux & Jacob, 2012): 
 
1) A positive meaning, according to which someone does something intentionally 
when he actively does it based on his or her desire to do it. 
2) A first contrastive meaning, according to which someone does something 
intentionally when he does it without being forced to do it. In this sense, 
“intentionally” is opposed to “unwillingly” or “by force”. 
3) A second contrastive meaning, according to which someone does something 
intentionally when he does it by having full control upon his action. In this 
sense, “intentionally” is opposed to “by accident” or “by sheer luck”. 
 
Note that, though such an account might account for the Knobe Effect by itself, it is also 
compatible with the account sketched in the previous section: “intentionally” can have 
different meanings that are all such that the truth-conditions of statements including them 
mimic the truth-conditions of statements including gradable terms. One advantage of 
combining the two accounts is that only the account based on an analogy with the semantics 
of gradable predicates can be extended to other predicates. 
The main idea of this account is that participants’ understanding of “intentionally” will 
be influenced by what they take to be the meaning of interest, and this will differ according to 
the context. If they are told about something they expect the agent to be in favor of (a good 
action, or something the agent desires), then the first meaning will seem to be the most 
relevant. If they are told about something they expect the agent to be opposed to (a bad action, 
something the agent does not want), the second meaning will appear to be the most relevant. 
Finally, if their attention is drawn towards the amount of control and skill a certain action 
requires, then the third meaning will turn out to be the most salient. 
Let’s apply this account to the Knobe and Skill Effects. In the Harm case, participants 
expect the agent to be against harming the environment, and thus select the second meaning. 
But the chairman, because he is indifferent, does not unwillingly harm the environment: thus, 
his action is judged intentional. In the Help case, participants expect the agent to be in favor 
of helping the environment, and thus select the first meaning. But the chairman does not 
desire to help the environment; thus, his action is considered unintentional. In the Bull’s-eye 
case, the setting makes salient questions of skill, and thus the third meaning, which is 
sensitive to the amount of control the agent exerts upon his action is selected. But, when the 
bull’s-eye is replaced by the agent’s Aunt, someone we expect him not to kill, then the second 
meaning becomes the most salient, and this meaning is not sensitive to the agent’s control. 
Aside from explaining both the Knobe and Skill Effects, this account has other non-
negligible advantages. First, contrary to pragmatic accounts, it does not have to claim that 
participants do not really speak their mind and use “intentionally” to convey something else. 
Second, contrary to bias accounts, it does not tax participants with general irrationality. 
However, contrary to Knobe’s account, it does not commit us to the paradoxical thesis that 
folk psychology is suffused with moral considerations, and it fits the general intuition that our 
concept of intentional action is primarily a descriptive psychological concept. Surely, moral 
considerations do influence the interpretation of “intentionally” the participants adopt, and 
have an impact on where the default point is set. But this does not make “intentionally” a 
more ‘moralized’ term than “cold”, “hot” or “many”.xiv Thus, this account preserve the main 
intuitions between what seemed conflicting accounts by acknowledging at the same time (i) 
that judgments about intentionality are impacted by moral considerations without participants 
being mistaken and (ii) that the concept of intentional action has a descriptive, psychological 
function. 
 
5. What consequences for action theory? 
 
The Skill Effect and more notably the Knobe Effect are two puzzling phenomena that have 
drawn a lot of attention, sometimes at the expense of the bigger picture. As can be seen from 
the present survey, numerous theories or the folk concept of intentional action have been 
proposed, and many do not live up to the task because they are too focused on a certain 
phenomenon, or a rather limited set of cases. My aim in this chapter was thus to shed light on 
the multiple puzzling phenomena a satisfying account of the folk concept of intentional action 
should account for. 
 Now, one might wonder what (philosophical) use there is for an appropriate 
understanding of our folk concept of intentional action. I began the survey by stressing that a 
philosophical account of intentional action should not stray too far from the folk concept. But 
what lessons should action theory draw from the empirical investigations I surveyed? In fact, 
the answer to this question depends on what turns out to be the right account of phenomena 
such as the Knobe Effect. At one end of the spectrum, we have accounts for which the Knobe 
Effect doesn’t teach us anything new or interesting about the folk concept of intentional 
action or intentional action itself: the Knobe Effect is just a bias, and lead people to use 
“intentionally” in ways that do not reflect their core understanding of what constitutes an 
intentional action (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010a). Thus, empirical investigations of the folk 
concept of intentional action have very little theoretical import: at best, they have practical 
value, by allowing us to detect biases that we should strive to correct (Nadelhoffer, 2006c). 
 At the other end of the spectrum, we have Knobe’s view, according to which the 
results of these researches should lead us to completely revise our understanding of folk 
psychology and of the nature and function of the concept of intentional action (Knobe, 2010). 
In this case, philosophers working in action theory would have to decide whether they choose 
to follow the folk understanding of intentional action, or whether they consider better to take a 
more revisionist stance. In both cases, these results would reveal a tension between the goal of 
following commonsense notions of intentional action and the goal of reaching a concept of 
intentional action one would be able to apply to actions independently from one’s moral 
values and commitments (an important goal, given the role that the concept of “intentional 
action” is supposed to play in moral and legal debates). 
 Finally, between these two extremes, there are several intermediate positions. If we 
follow accounts that consider that the Knobe Effect cannot be explained away but can 
nonetheless be explained without appeal to normative and evaluative considerations, then 
these empirical investigations do not have the revolutionary consequences Knobe expect them 
to have, but can still teach us interesting facts about the factors people take into account when 
considering an action as intentional (such as the consideration one gives to a particular side-
effect; see Scaife & Webber, 2013). In this case, philosophical accounts of intentional action 
might consider integrating these factors into their account. And if we follow accounts 
according to which “intentionally’ comes into different senses, then we might end up 
criticizing as doomed the philosophical project aiming at finding a definition of “intentional” 
that would encompass all our (non-biased) intuitions about the truth-value of sentences 
including “intentionally” (Cova, Dupoux & Jacob, 2012). In this case, philosophers might 
renounce the project of finding a unitary and proper definition of intentional action, and 
instead start discussing which meaning of “intentionally” is relevant for the moral and 
normative questions the concept is supposed to address. 
 Anyway, it is impossible to determine on a priori grounds what will be the 
philosophical consequences of current empirical investigations of our folk concept of 
intentional action. To put it otherwise: this is also an empirical question. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Knobe’s original account (after Knobe, 2006). Judgments of praise and blame are, 
as is widely assumed, the results of both the outcome’s evaluation (is it good or bad?) and 
ascriptions of intentionality (did the agent bring about the outcome intentionally?) However, 
what conditions need to be fulfilled for the action to count as intentional is itself determined 
by judgments about the outcome’s valence. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Default points for the ‘coldness’ of beverages according to Pettit and Knobe (2009). 
As one can see, whether a beverage counts as cold is not function only of its actual 
temperature (here 20°C), but also of whether this temperature is situated beyond or above the 
expected temperature for each beverage. Thus, a 20°C coffee counts as cold, while a 20°C 
beer does not, while both have the same temperature. 
 
  
Figure 3. Default points for the agent’s attitudes towards the outcome in the Harm and Help 
cases according to Pettit and Knobe (2009). The expected attitude is not the same in both 
cases: in the Harm cases, the expected attitude is below indifference (“being opposed to”) 
while it is beyond in the Help case (“being in favor of”). Thus, a chairman holding the very 
same attitude (“indifference”) does not reach the relevant default point for intentionality in the 
Help case, but more than fulfill it in the Harm case. 
 
  
Figure 4. Percentages of participants judging the side-effect intentional (dark bars) and desire 
ratings on a scale from 0 to 6 (grey curve) in Guglielmo and Malle (2010) for the original 
Harm and Help cases and for the modified cases (“Regretful Harm” and “Joyful Help”). 
Intentionality ratings seem to covary with desire ratings when one look only for the three 
cases on the left. However, one can also observe that desire ratings are equal for the “Harm” 
and “Joyful Help” case, while intentionality ratings are much higher in the second than the 
first. This suggests that the same attitude towards the outcome generates higher intentionality 
ratings when the outcome is a bad one, and that ascriptions of intentionality are not fully 
explained by the agent’s attitude towards the outcome. 
 
 
                                                 
i
 For empirical evidence on the distinction between intentions and desires, see Malle and Knobe (2001). 
ii
 For similar phenomena, see Nadelhoffer (2004a, 2005, 2006a, 2006b). 
iii
 For previous surveys, see Feltz (2007), Cova (2010) and Cova, Dupoux & Jacob (2012). 
iv
 This ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ do not have to be specifically moral, as shown by the fact that there can be 
instances of the Knobe Effect involving aesthetic values (Knobe, 2004b). 
v
 For similar cases featuring regretful agents, see Sverdlik (2004), Phelan and Sarkissian (2008) (the City 
Planner case), Lanteri (2009) (the Lever case) and Shepherd (2012). 
vi
 For another example of an asymmetry that does not seem to involve norms, see the pair of Apple Tree cases in 
Nanay (2010) and Cova and Naar (2012b). 
vii
 For a similar attempt at ‘explaining away’ the Skill Effect, see Guglielmo and Malle (2010b). 
                                                                                                                                                        
viii
 For critical discussion, see Rose et al. (2012) and Cova and Naar (2012b). 
ix
 To defend his hypothesis, Machery relies on two often used and much discussed cases: the Free Cup and Extra 
Dollar cases. For criticism of Machery’s hypothesis, see Mallon (2008) and Phelan and Sarkissian (2009). For 
an account very similar to Machery’s but using the notion of ‘obstacle’ in place of the notion of ‘trade-off’, see 
Sauer (2014). 
x
 A related but slightly different account is proposed by Nanay (2010). According to Nanay, we judge a foreseen 
side effect to be intentional if the following modal claim is true: if the agent had not ignored considerations 
about the foreseen side effect, her action might have been different (other things being equal). However, it is not 
clear how this account would explain participants’ answers in both Pond cases and in the Terrorist case. 
xi
 For a detailed defense of this claim, see Cova, Dupoux & Jacob (2012). 
xii
 Does this make “intentionally” itself a gradable term? Not necessarily. To my knowledge, there is no 
empirical evidence allowing us to conclude that people do or do treat “intentionally” as a gradable term. 
xiii
 There is no published study investigating the Skill Effect for other psychological predicates. However, I have 
collected preliminary evidence that psychological predicates such as “desire”, “intend” and “believe” are not 
subject to the Skill Effect. “Know”, though, seems to display a pattern similar to the Skill Effect, but (i) the 
effect is much smaller and (ii) only holds for bad outcome, and does not exist in the case of good outcomes, 
which suggests that we are dealing with a different phenomenon. 
xiv
 Additional advantages of this account include its ability to explain how ascriptions of intentionality can be 
manipulated by phrasing questions differently (Malle, 2006; Falkenstien, 2013) and why there seems to be so 
many individual differences on judgments of intentionality (Feltz & Cokely, 2007, 2011; Cokely & Feltz, 2009). 
